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THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF 
PROSECUTORIAL POWER 
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY* 
The key to the growing prominence of prosecutors, both in the United 
States and elsewhere, lies in the prosecutor’s preeminent ability to bridge 
organizational and conceptual divides in criminal justice.  Above all else, 
prosecutors are mediating figures, straddling the frontiers between 
adversarial and inquisitorial justice, between the police and the courts, and 
between law and discretion.  By blurring these boundaries, prosecutors 
provide the criminal justice system with three different kinds of flexibility—
ideological, institutional, and operational—and they strengthen their own 
hands in a legal culture that increasingly disfavors institutional rigidity and 
hard-and-fast commitments.  At the same time, though, the mediating role 
of the prosecutor frustrates traditional strategies for holding government 
accountable.  The bridges that prosecutors provide—between law and 
politics, rules and discretion, courts and police, advocacy and objectivity—
make curtailing prosecutorial power and taming prosecutorial discretion 
trickier business than is often suggested, or at least a different kind of 
business. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much of what is wrong with American criminal justice—its racial 
inequity, its excessive severity, its propensity for error—is increasingly 
blamed on prosecutors.1  Moreover, prosecutors seem to be getting ever 
more powerful, not just in the United States, but in much of the rest of the 
world as well.2  The nature of prosecutorial power and the reasons for its 
growth remain murky, though.  As a result, it is hard to know exactly what 
to make of prosecutors or what we should expect from them.  There is 
plenty of thoughtful, well-informed scholarship on prosecutors, especially 
in the United States, but most of this work is self-consciously pragmatic.  It 
takes the modern prosecutor’s office as a given, a dragon that we find living 
in our midst and wish to tame.  My goal here is slightly different, less 
immediately reformist.  I want to step back and try to understand the 
dragon: what kind of animal it is and why it is with us. 
The haze surrounding prosecutors is both descriptive and conceptual.  
On the descriptive side, we know much less about prosecutors than we do 
about the other main officials in the criminal justice system: judges and the 
police.  Unlike judges, prosecutors generally do not announce the grounds 
for their decisions—or even, often, the fact that they have made a decision.  
And unlike the police, prosecutors carry out most of their work behind 
closed doors.  Although law enforcement remains in many ways a secretive 
occupation, the bulk of patrol work is necessarily done in public, and it has 
become common over the past half-century for large police departments to 
 
1  See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional 
Wisdom on Prison Growth is Wrong, and Where We Can Go From Here, 26 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 265 (2014) (prison growth); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing 
and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 
YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2013) (racial inequity); Editorial, 152 Innocents, Marked for Death, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2015, at A18 (wrongful convictions). 
2  See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Introduction to Adversarial and 
Inquisitorial Systems—Distinctive Aspects and Convergent Trends, in THE PROSECUTOR IN 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 177 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Rachel E. 
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative 
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874, 921 (2009); Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in 
Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2012). 
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open themselves to outside researchers.3 As a result, we now have 
qualitative, observational accounts of virtually every sort of task that police 
officers carry out.  We have nothing like that for prosecutors.4  At the 
quantitative level, as well, we have detailed information about the 
demographics of police workforces and fine-grained statistics about 
investigatory stops, citations, summonses, and arrests.5  We have good data 
on judges and on judicial case management, too, from bail decisions 
through sentencing.6  By comparison the statistics on prosecutors and their 
exercises of discretion are meager.7 
If anything, the conceptual fog around prosecutors is even thicker.  
Evaluating prosecutors who seek reelection is difficult not just because the 
available information about how they run their offices is so limited,8 but 
also because it is unclear what information we should want.  Even when 
what prosecutors have done is reasonably plain, it can be hard to know how 
to assess it.  In the second half of 2014, for example, prosecutors in 
Missouri and New York failed to indict the white police officers responsible 
for separate, widely publicized killings of unarmed black men.  In each 
case, the prosecutors said they had provided a grand jury with all of the 
relevant evidence, both incriminating and exculpatory, and the grand jurors 
had made their own, independent assessment that no charges were 
justified.9  Modern grand juries are famously docile,10 so pinning the 
 
3  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FAIRNESS AND 
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING].  
4  See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 2, at 25–26. 
5  See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense 
of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006); 
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 3. 
6  See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: 
AN OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2015).  
7  See, e.g., KATHERINE J. BIES ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD 
LAW SCH., STUCK IN THE ‘70S: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF CALIFORNIA PROSECUTORS 7–8 
(2015); John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited 
Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 177 (2015); Ronald F. Wright et al., The 
Many Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 27, 32–34 (2014). 
8  See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 166–67 (2007); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 
WASH. L. REV. 69 (2011). 
9  See, e.g., Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Sizing Up a Prosecutor’s Performance: Staten 
Island District Attorney Gets Mixed Reviews on Handling of Grand Jury in Eric Garner 
Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2014, at A20; David Zucchino, Grand Jury Move Stokes 
Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2014, at A11. 
10  See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the 
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decision on them sounded a little like Mr. Spenlow blaming his law partner 
for his own stinginess—explaining with “gentle melancholy” that “it is an 
irksome incident in my professional life, that I am not at liberty to consult 
my own wishes.”11  But what should the prosecutors have done?  Some 
critics faulted them for presenting exculpatory information to the grand 
jurors: that was acting like defense attorneys, not like prosecutors.12  But 
prosecutors are often attacked precisely for failing to present the evidence 
to grand juries evenhandedly.13  Some observers thought the prosecutors in 
the Missouri and New York cases were insufficiently responsive to their 
constituents.14  Others said the prosecutors, at least in Staten Island, may 
have been too responsive to their constituents.15  But how should public 
opinion influence prosecutorial decisions?  In what ways, if any, do we 
want prosecutors to be politically accountable? 
These questions are so thorny in large part because our expectations of 
 
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995).  In 2015, California required prosecutors to 
decide for themselves whether to file homicide charges against police officers; tellingly, the 
California District Attorneys Association opposed the change on the ground that the “option” 
of grand jury proceedings “should remain available as a tool for prosecutors.”  Melody 
Gutierrez, State Ends Secret Hearings in Police Killings of Civilians, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 11, 
2015), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/California-eliminates-use-of-grand-juries-to-
6438501.php. 
11  CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 473 (Nonesuch Press 1937) (1850). 
12  See, e.g., Alice Ollstein & Kira Lerner, Experts Blast Ferguson Prosecutor’s Press 
Conference, Legal Strategy, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 25, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/exp
erts-blast-ferguson-prosecutors-press-conference-legal-strategy-202dfd230ad3#.i060qg575. 
13  In fact, the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution Function, although lacking legal force, explicitly direct that “[n]o prosecutor 
should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to negate guilt or 
mitigate the offense.”  CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3-
3.6(b) (2015).  The commentary to Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct—
the only provision of the rules directly addressing prosecutors—also used to make clear that 
prosecutors should disclose exculpatory evidence to grand juries, but that language was 
deleted in 2002.  See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 152.  The Supreme Court, for its part, has ruled 
that federal prosecutors have no legal obligation to present exculpatory evidence to grand 
juries.  See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51–54 (1992).  The National District 
Attorneys Association ducks the question by recommending that prosecutors disclose 
exculpatory evidence to grand juries “as required by law or applicable rules of ethical 
conduct.”  NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-3.5(a) (Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n 
2009). 
14  See, e.g., Alex Altman, Grand Jury Process Raises Questions About a Ferguson 
Indictment, TIME (Sept. 18, 2014), http://time.com/3399022/ferguson-michael-brown-darren-
wilson-grand-jury/. 
15  Cf. Tonry, supra note 2, at 12 (arguing against “democratic accountability” for 
prosecutors, “since it seems self-evident that external considerations should be irrelevant to 
decisions in individual cases”). 
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prosecutors are so conflicting.16  We want them to be zealous advocates and 
impartial reviewers of the facts, crime fighters and instruments of mercy, 
law enforcement leaders and officers of the court, loyal public servants and 
independent professionals, champions of community values and defenders 
of the rule of law.  We have conflicting expectations of other officials, too, 
but not to the same extent.  I will argue that this is actually the key to 
understanding prosecutors: above all else, they are mediating figures, 
bridging organizational and theoretical divides in criminal justice.  The 
boundary-blurring nature of prosecutorial power, I will suggest, helps to 
explain its rise and is critical to thinking sensibly about its control, 
reformation, or replacement. 
First, though, I need to lay some groundwork.  Part I of this Article 
will address the perception and reality of prosecutorial power.  What do 
people mean when they say that prosecutors are the most influential actors 
in the criminal justice system and are growing increasingly more powerful, 
and what evidence supports these claims?  Part I will also examine the 
extent to which prosecutorial power is a distinctly American phenomenon 
or a worldwide trend.  Two or three decades ago it was conventional 
wisdom that prosecutors in the United States had no parallels overseas,17 
and even today it is common to stress the uniqueness of the American 
prosecutor.18  But there is also a growing literature suggesting that 
prosecutorial power is on the rise elsewhere in the world, especially in 
Europe.19  So how exceptional is the United States in this regard?  Finally, 
Part I will assess and ultimately reject a common, two-part explanation for 
the rise of prosecutorial power: burgeoning caseloads and the growth of 
plea bargaining.  The story is that as criminal caseloads have ballooned, the 
system has been forced to forego trials in favor of consensual settlements, 
and the haggling over outcomes has made prosecutors more important and 
 
16  They are thorny also, in part, because we have competing ideas about democracy.  See 
David Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and Democracy in 
the United States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (Máximo 
Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., forthcoming 2017). 
17  See, e.g., JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY xv, 
6 (1980); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: 
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1325 (1993). 
18  See, e.g., John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative 
Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3, 4 (John L. Worrall & M. 
Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008); Tonry, supra note 2. 
19  See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1413, 1427 (2010). 
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more powerful.20  The biggest problem with this explanation is the direction 
of causation.  It is unclear whether rising caseloads have led to more plea 
bargaining, or whether plea bargaining instead has increased caseloads by 
expanding the system’s capacity, the way that widening a highway can 
bring more traffic.21  Nor is it clear whether prosecutorial power has been 
boosted by the rise of plea bargaining, or for that matter by swelling 
caseloads, as opposed to vice versa.  It is not even obvious, as an initial 
matter, why more criminal cases or more plea bargaining should be 
expected to bolster prosecutorial power. 
Part II of the Article will advance a different explanation for the 
growing clout of prosecutors, rooted in a specific understanding of the 
prosecutor’s role.  I will argue that prosecutors are first and foremost 
mediating figures.  They mediate between law and discretion, between 
vengeance and mercy, between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, 
and between courts and police.  This mediating role is what distinguishes 
prosecutors most significantly from other actors in the criminal justice 
system, and it is likely why the system has come to rely on them so heavily.  
Accordingly, Part III of the Article will suggest that the mediating functions 
performed by prosecutors must be taken into account if we are to think 
productively about curtailing the power of prosecutors, refashioning their 
self-image, or altering their behavior. 
One sign of our impoverished thinking about prosecutors is that the 
agenda for prosecutorial reform in recent years has so often been cribbed 
from police reform.  “Community policing” seemed successful, so why not 
“community prosecution”?22  “Intelligence-led policing” and “predictive 
policing” lead to talk of “intelligence-driven prosecution”23  and “predictive 
prosecution.”24  And when our aspirations for prosecutors do not echo the 
 
20  See, e.g., id. at 1439–40; Chris Lewis, The Evolving Role of the English Crown 
Prosecution Service, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 214, 219 (Erik 
Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Josef Zila, Prosecutorial Powers and Policy Making 
in Sweden and the Other Nordic Countries, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 235, 249 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012). 
21  See, e.g., DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY 
AND LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 158–64 (2016).  
22  See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 305 
(2011); Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465 (2002); 
Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 
(2002); Ronald F. Wright, Community Prosecution, Comparative Prosecution, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 361 (2012). 
23  Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance Jr.’s ‘Moneyball’ Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyball-
approach-to-crime.html. 
24  Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, A Smarter Way to Prosecute, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 
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latest buzzwords in policing, they are often close to vacuous.  Attorney 
General Robert Jackson’s famous 1940 address to the United States 
Attorneys asked them to rededicate themselves “to the spirit of fair play and 
decency.”25  Jackson explained that “[t]he qualities of a good prosecutor are 
as elusive and as impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman,” 
and “those who need to be told would not understand it anyway.”26  Pretty 
much the most Jackson could say was that the good prosecutor “tempers 
zeal with human kindness, . . . seeks truth and not victims, . . . serves the 
law and not factional purposes, and . . . approaches his task with 
humility.”27  Justice Sutherland’s equally celebrated remarks five years 
earlier for the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States urged prosecutors 
to proceed with “earnestness and vigor”—striking “hard blows” but not 
“foul ones,” forswearing “improper methods calculated to produce a 
wrongful conviction” but employing “every legitimate means to bring about 
a just one.”28 
Jackson’s speech and Berger are hallowed texts;29 they are for 
prosecutors what the Peelian Principles are for police officers.30  And like 
 
2014, at A24.  
25  Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4 
(1940). 
26  Id. at 6. 
27  Id.  
28  295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  Like Jackson, Justice Sutherland seemed to think that being a 
good prosecutor was something like being a gentleman; he faulted the prosecutor in Berger 
for conduct that was “undignified,” “intemperate,” and “thoroughly indecorous and 
improper.”  Id. at 84, 85. 
29  For an utterly typical invocation of Berger, see Memorandum from David W. Ogden, 
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Dep’t Prosecutors, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Jan. 4, 2010) (declaring that “Justice Sutherland’s observations regarding the role of a 
prosecutor are as true today as they were when he wrote them over 70 years ago”).  Ogden 
also noted, as federal prosecutors are wont to do, that an inscription outside the Attorney 
General’s office declares that “[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its 
citizens in the courts”—echoing both Justice Sutherland’s observation in Berger that a 
United States Attorney’s interest in a criminal case is simply “that justice shall be done,” 295 
U.S. at 88, and Jackson’s virtually identical pronouncement that “[a]lthough the government 
technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been done,” Jackson, supra note 25, 
at 4. It is worth noting the passive voice in all of these formulations, which in its own way 
reflects the notion that the prosecutor’s role is to mediate within the criminal justice system.  
The prosecutor’s job is not to do justice but to see that it “is done”: the prosecutor is less an 
independent minister of justice than a kind of systemic lubricant or catalyst. 
30  Regarding the principles of policing attributed (probably in error) to Sir Robert Peel, 
see generally Susan A. Lentz & Robert H. Chaires, The Invention of Peel’s Principles: A 
Study of Policing ‘Textbook’ History, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 69 (2007).  The Peelian Principles, 
which famously declare that “the police are the public and the public are the police” and 
counsel the police to “secure the willing cooperation of the public” without “catering to the 
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the Peelian Principles they serve too often as a substitute for thought.  With 
some justification, Ian Loader faults the Peelian Principles not only for 
saying too little but also for lacking legal force.31  They are paragons of 
specificity, though, compared with “fair play,” “decency,” and striking 
“hard blows” but not “foul ones.”  (Jackson’s speech actually had a bit 
more content than that, but the content, as we will see, is usually 
disregarded in favor of the bromides.32)  Furthermore, while the Peelian 
Principles themselves do not have constitutional stature, they are 
supplemented both in Britain and in the United States with systems of 
restraints on the exercise of police discretion far more extensive than 
anything either country has developed for prosecutors33—restraints that 
themselves reflect, particularly in the United States, nuanced if not always 
consistent ideas about the role of the police in a democratic society.34  We 
have nothing like that for prosecutors, and the absence of coherent 
aspirations may go a long way toward explaining the dearth of meaningful 
rules. 
I. POWER 
The starting point for virtually every discussion of prosecutors in the 
United States is their tremendous clout.  “The American prosecutor rules 
the criminal justice system,”35 exercising “almost limitless discretion”36  
 
public opinion,” see, e.g., William J. Bratton, Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/sir-robert-peels-
nine-principles-of-policing.html, have become “central to the self-understanding of Anglo-
American policing.”  Ian Loader, Recasting Civic Policing: Beyond “Peelian” Principles, in 
The Future of Criminal Law: Working Papers from the 2014 Annual Conference of the 
Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1, 1 (Michelle Madden Dempsey et al 
eds., 2014).  Former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, for example, 
singled out the Peelian Principles as the foundational text of modern law enforcement, “as 
relevant and meaningful today as they were in the 1830s.”  William Bratton, Peel’s Nine 
Principles of Policing, COMMISSIONER’S CORNER (Mar. 6, 2014) (on file with author).  
31  Loader, supra note 30, at 1. 
32  See infra text accompanying note 62. 
33  Regarding the possibility, minimally realized, that prosecutors in the United States 
might be regulated by professional rules and standards, see supra note 13; infra notes 161 & 
233, and accompanying text.  
34  See generally DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008). 
35  Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Preface to THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE xi, xi (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012). 
36  Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, supra note 19, at 1414–15;  cf., e.g., Rachel E. 
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1049 (2006) 
(describing the “almost unbridled discretion” of prosecutors to “make all the key judgments” 
in criminal cases); STUNTZ, supra note 22, at 87 (stressing the “enormous discretionary 
power” of prosecutors in the United States). 
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and “virtually absolute power.”37  The concentration of power in the hands 
of prosecutors has been called the “overriding evil” of American criminal 
justice38—which is saying something, given the range and magnitude of the 
system’s problems.  Nor is this a new concern.  Since at least the early 
twentieth century, “[t]he immense authority of the public prosecutor over 
criminal justice has been a universally recognized feature of American 
criminal prosecution . . . .”39  Robert Jackson took it as obvious in 1940 that 
“[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any 
other person in America.”40 Since then, prosecutors in the United States are 
widely thought to have grown significantly more powerful,41 and 
prosecutors elsewhere may be catching up.  There are reports, in particular, 
that “the European prosecutor is beginning to look like his American 
counterpart, with the de facto and sometimes de jure authority to adjudicate 
cases.”42 In Europe, as in the United States, prosecutors are now said to 
“loom[] over [judges] both in power and importance.”43  Before turning to 
 
37  Marc L. Miller, Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004); see also, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus 
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960–61 (2009); Erik Luna, Prosecutor 
King, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 48, 57–70 (2014); Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, 
The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2014); DAVIS, 
supra note 8, at 3–5; Barkow, supra note 2, at 874–75. 
38  Donald A. Dripps, Reinventing Plea Bargaining, in The Future of Criminal Law: 
Working Papers from the 2014 Annual Conference of the Robina Institute of Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, supra note 30, at 55, 60; see also Barkow, supra note 2, at 871; Luna, 
supra note 37, at 102. 
39  Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal 
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 
568 (1984); see also, e.g., Newman F. Baker, The Prosecutor—Initiation of Prosecution, 23 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770, 796 (1933) (arguing that the prosecutor’s discretionary 
charging decisions effectively constitute “the ‘law’ to the ordinary man”); Pizzi, supra note 
17, at 1336 (observing that the “premise from which all proposals to reform the American 
prosecutor seem to begin” is concern that essentially limitless charging discretion makes 
American prosecutors “nearly omnipotent”). 
40  Jackson, supra note 25, at 25. 
41  See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 210–30 (2003); William T. Pizzi, A Perfect Storm: Prosecutorial 
Discretion in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 189, 
190 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Wesley M. Oliver, Charles Lindbergh, 
Caryl Chessman, and the Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (2015); James Vorenberg, Decent 
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1573 (1981). 
42  Luna, supra note 37, at 67. 
43  Stephen C. Thaman, The Penal Order: Prosecutorial Sentencing as a Model for 
Criminal Justice Reform?, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 156, 156 
(Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012). 
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the common explanations for these developments, it is worth taking a closer 
look at the nature of the power that prosecutors exercise, as well as the 
degree to which the American prosecutor remains unique from a global 
perspective. 
A. DESCRIBING AND MEASURING PROSECUTORIAL POWER 
Discussions of prosecutorial power almost always proceed on the 
unstated assumption that we know what “power” means in this context and 
how to assess it.  But power is a notoriously “elusive concept”44; there is a 
long, unsettled debate among social scientists about how best to define it.45  
So what kind of power is it that American prosecutors seem to have so 
much of? 
Social scientists commonly understand power either in terms of 
influence—controlling the actions that other people take—or in terms of 
outcomes—controlling what happens to other people.  Thus, power can be 
understood as the ability to “get [someone else] to do something he [or she] 
would not otherwise do,”46 or alternatively as the ability to “modify others’ 
states by providing or withholding resources or administering 
punishments.”47  Under either view, power is relational, defined in part by 
its subjects: “one cannot say that someone has power without specifying 
 
44  KEITH M. DOWDING, RATIONAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL POWER 1 (1991); see also 
STEWART R. CLEGG, FRAMEWORKS OF POWER xv (1989) (calling power the “most ‘contested’ 
of concepts”); DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES, AND USES vii–ix, xxvii (1995) 
(surveying the “conflations and ambiguities” plaguing the “elusive” concept of power); John 
C. Turner, Explaining the Nature of Power: A Three-Process Theory, 35 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (2005) (observing that the definition of power “has long been a murky 
business”). 
45  See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Jennifer Berdahl, Social Power, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: 
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 678, 678 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d 
ed. 2007); Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 201 (1957); Dacher 
Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265, 265 (2003); 
DOWDING, supra note 44, at 3–16; WRONG, supra note 44, at 2. 
46  Dahl, supra note 45, at 204; see also, John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The 
Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER 150, 150 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 
1959). 
47  Keltner et al., supra note 45, at 265; see also Dorwin Cartwright, A Field Theoretical 
Conception of Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER, supra note 46, at 183, 193; WRONG, 
supra note 44, at 2, 21; Ezra Stotland, Peer Groups and Reactions to Power Figures, in 
STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER, supra note 46, at 53, 54; Fiske & Berdahl, supra note 45, at 679. 
Wrong draws a useful distinction between “power over” (by which he means the ability to 
get other people to do things) and “power to” (by which he means, roughly, the ability to 
change outcomes); he argues that the former is simply a special case of the latter, 
distinguished by the motive of the power wielder.  See WRONG, supra note 44, at 220–21. 
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over whom.”48  And under either view power is further demarcated, 
typically, by its scope and its magnitude—that is to say, by the range of 
actions or outcomes it controls, and by how completely it controls those 
things.49 
Prosecutorial power is most naturally defined in terms of outcomes, 
but it also can be understood—and sometimes may need to be understood—
as a matter of influence.  The power of prosecutors, Jackson said, resides in 
their “control over life, liberty, and reputation.”50  He explained that the 
prosecutor: 
can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done 
to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations. . . .  The 
prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on 
the basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be indicted 
and held for trial.  He may dismiss the case before trial, in which case the defense 
never has a chance to be heard.  Or he may go on with a public trial.  If he obtains a 
conviction, the prosecutor can still make recommendations as to sentence, as to 
whether the prisoner should get probation or a suspended sentence, and after he is put 
away, as to whether he is a fit subject for parole.51 
This is the way prosecutorial power is usually described.  It is the power to 
wreck lives, to put people on trial, and to lock them up—in short, to create 
dire outcomes.52  But even in Jackson’s canonical account, the prosecutor’s 
power depends in part on an ability to “make recommendations” that 
others—judges and parole boards—then follow.53  And when you think 
about it, pretty much everything a prosecutor does is done through others.  
The prosecutor gets law enforcement officers to investigate, magistrates to 
issue warrants, grand juries to indict, defendants to plead guilty (or, if 
necessary, trial juries to convict), and judges to imprison.  Little of this is 
done by actually ordering anyone to do anything; almost all of it is 
influence.54  We might say that the power of prosecutors is the ability to 
cause outcomes through influence.55 
 
48  Fiske & Berdahl, supra note 45, at 680; see also WRONG, supra note 44, at xxi; Dahl, 
supra note 45, at 206. 
49  See Dahl, supra note 45, at 203, 205–06. 
50  Jackson, supra note 25, at 3. 
51  Id. 
52  See, e.g., Luna, supra note 34, at 57–60. 
53  Jackson, supra note 25, at 3. 
54  See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003). 
55  In this respect, prosecutorial power exemplifies what Dowding calls “social power”—
“the ability of an actor deliberately to change the incentive structure of another actor or 
actors to bring about, or help bring about outcomes.”  DOWDING, supra note 44, at 48.  
Dowding distinguishes social power from “outcome power,” which does not necessarily 
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Much of the prosecutor’s influence depends, in turn, on an ability to 
threaten outcomes; this is notably true in the context of plea bargaining, and 
it is true as well when prosecutors agree to forego charges against 
organizations in exchange for commitments for institutional reform and 
self-monitoring—arrangements commonly called “non-prosecution 
agreements” or “deferred prosecution agreements.”56  But some of the 
prosecutors’ influence stems less from their ability to make threats or 
promises than from their air of authority and their ongoing relationships 
with judges, probation officers, law enforcement agents, and legislators.57 
What can be said about the subjects, the scope, and the magnitude of 
prosecutorial power?  Set aside magnitude for the moment; we will return 
to it shortly.  The subjects of prosecutorial power are criminal defendants 
and potential criminal defendants, and the scope, traditionally, has been 
limited to the results of criminal cases.  Prosecutors have no greater ability 
than anyone else to hail a cab during rush hour or to get Congress to create 
a new national park.  Obviously, though, criminal cases are important, so 
even powers exercised only in this context are worth worrying about.  And 
the restrictions on the subjects and scope of prosecutorial power have 
significantly loosened over the past several decades. 
The most important development in this regard probably has not been 
the expanding scope of criminal prohibitions in the United States, despite 
the widespread concern that “overcriminalization” has made a larger and 
larger range of conduct potentially the subject of a criminal prosecution.58  
The scope of prosecutorial power plainly has been increased by some 
expansions in the range of criminalization: the treatment of immigration 
 
require a social relationship; outcome power is simply “the ability of an actor to bring about 
or help to bring about outcomes.”  Id. Social power, as Dowding defines it, is part of what 
Turner calls the “standard theory of power” in the social sciences—a theory that defines 
power as “the capacity to influence other people” through “the control of resources (positive 
and negative outcomes, rewards and costs, information, etc.) that are desired, valued or 
needed by others.”  Turner, supra note 44, at 2. 
56  See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 
(2007). 
57  See, e.g., Richman, supra note 54, at 755–94.  In this respect prosecutors may provide 
support for recent suggestions by some social scientists that power should be understood as 
having less to do with “dependence relationships” than with group dynamics and “the basis 
of organized, collective action.”  Turner, supra note 44, at 2; see also JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 4–6 (1983) (distinguishing “condign power,” based 
on threats, from “compensatory power,” based on rewards, and “conditioned power,” which 
is “exercised through changing belief” by “education, or . . . social commitment”). 
58  See, e.g., Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 785, 793–95 (2012). 
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violations as criminal offenses is a good example.59 But it is not clear, on 
the whole, that criminal prohibitions reach further today than in the past.  
Many things that did not used to be crimes now are, but the converse is true 
as well: there are also lots of things that used be crimes—adultery, sodomy, 
loitering, buying and selling alcohol—that are not anymore.60 
What do seem to have changed, though, are public and professional 
attitudes about using the criminal law as a lever to reach conduct that might 
not itself be criminally punishable.  There is growing comfort with, and 
even enthusiasm for, what used to be called “pretextual prosecutions”: 
criminal cases in which the offense charged is just an expedient way to 
convict, lock up, or exert leverage over a defendant targeted for other 
reasons.61  In his speech to the United States Attorneys, Robert Jackson 
located “the most dangerous power of the prosecutor” in the ability to pick 
defendants instead of picking cases: 
With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair 
chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost 
anyone.  In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime 
and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man 
and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some 
offense on him.62 
Part of Jackson’s worry was that prosecutions of this kind could easily 
become “personal.”63 The “real crime” might simply be that the defendant 
was “unpopular with the predominant or governing group,” had “the wrong 
political views,” or was “personally obnoxious to or in the way of the 
prosecutor.”64  But his warning plainly reflected a broader discomfort with 
giving prosecutors the authority to determine who deserved punishment, for 
whatever reason, as long as they could rummage around and find a charge 
to file.  The unease was captured in the once widespread intuition that there 
 
59  See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 194–96 (2012). 
60  See generally Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
223 (2007).  Reviewing the long history of legislatures “repealing or narrowing criminal 
statutes, reducing offense severity, and converting low-level crimes to civil infractions,” 
Brown argues plausibly that “criminal law’s substantive scope is almost surely narrower in 
most respects than in the past, at least in its effect on most citizens.”  Id. at 225–26 
(emphasis omitted). 
61  See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An 
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005). 
62  Jackson, supra note 25, at 5.  Justice Scalia quoted this passage toward the end of his 
now celebrated dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–28 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
63  Jackson, supra note 25, at 5. 
64  Id. 
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was something wrong with a “pretextual prosecution.”65 But that intuition 
has weakened, and the term itself has begun to sound archaic.  More and 
more, prosecutors are applauded for “picking the man and then searching 
the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on 
him.”66 This is exactly what is meant, for example, by “intelligence-driven 
prosecution.”67 Here is how a supervisor with the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s office describes the strategy: “We figured out who are the 
people driving crime in Manhattan, and for four years we focused on taking 
them out.”68 
The fading stigma associated with pretextual prosecutions is part of a 
broader trend in legal consciousness.  For want of a better term, this larger 
trend might be called “ad hoc instrumentalism”; it is the tendency to view 
legal procedures as a set of interchangeable tools, which government 
officials can and should apply on a case-by-case basis, depending on what 
promises to be effective in addressing a particular problem or particular 
individuals thought to be dangerous or undesirable.69 Deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution agreements reached with large organizations reflect 
this same trend: they allow prosecutors to use the criminal law as a 
bludgeon to coerce broad, organizational reform.70 Crimmigration—the 
blurring of the line between criminal law and immigration—is part of this 
trend, too; so is the use of parole and probation revocations as a parallel 
system of criminal justice.71 Each of these developments has served to 
increase the subjects and the scope of prosecutorial power, by expanding 
the range of individuals who are potential defendants in criminal cases, 
and—more importantly—by expanding the range of conduct that it seems 
appropriate for prosecutors to coerce. 
The bottom line is that the subjects and scope of prosecutorial power, 
while very far from unlimited, have long been appreciable and have 
 
65  See, e.g., Richman & Stuntz, supra note 61. 
66  Jackson, supra note 25, at 5. 
67  See Brown, supra note 23; Mac Donald, supra note 24. 
68  See Brown, supra note 23 (quoting Karen Friedman Agnifilo); cf. Jessica Anderson & 
Justin Fenton, Mosby Announces New Leadership, Strategies, BALT. SUN (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-mosby-staff-changes-2015011
4-story.html (describing creation of new unit in Baltimore State’s Attorney’s Office to “help 
target problem individuals”). 
69  See Sklansky, supra note 59.  This was the set of ideas that California prosecutors 
reflexively, if unsuccessfully, invoked when they argued for keeping grand jury proceedings 
available as an optional “tool” in cases involving deaths at the hands of the police.  See 
Gutierrez, supra note 10. 
70  See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 56. 
71  See Sklansky, supra note 59, at 197–208. 
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recently grown larger.  What about the magnitude of prosecutorial power?  
By “magnitude” I mean roughly what Robert Dahl called the “amount” of 
power: “the change in probabilities” caused by the exercise of power.72 In 
other words, how strongly can a prosecutor change the likelihood that a 
particular subject of prosecutorial power will engage in certain conduct 
within the scope of prosecutorial power?  How much more likely can a 
prosecutor make it that, say, a defendant will be convicted, that a noncitizen 
will be deported, or that a corporation will change its accounting 
procedures? 
The core of prosecutorial power is the ability to convict people of 
crimes.  More particularly, the core of prosecutorial power in the United 
States today, as it is generally described, is the ability to coerce guilty pleas.  
So let us begin there.  What can be said about the magnitude of this core 
aspect of prosecutorial power? 
It will not do simply to say that prosecutors must have “virtually 
absolute power” since “[e]veryone pleads guilty.”73 Everyone doesn’t plead 
guilty.  Most people are never charged, and many people who are charged 
have their cases thrown out.74 It is true that criminal defendants whose cases 
are not dismissed plead guilty at very high rates, upwards of 90%.  Guilty 
pleas vastly outnumber trials.75 But some of that, obviously, is case 
selection.  Conviction rates are high in part because prosecutors choose 
their defendants and because judges dismiss the weakest cases.76 Another 
part of the explanation for high conviction rates is that prosecutors trade 
things away: that is what makes a plea bargain a plea bargain.  The majority 
of civil cases wind up settling, too,77 but most people do not take this as 
proof that civil plaintiffs have vast power, or even that they have the upper 
hand.78 
 
72  Dahl, supra note 45, at 203, 206.  On Dahl’s views of power and their impact, see, 
e.g., CLEGG, supra note 44, at 1–59. 
73  Miller, supra note 37, at 1252. 
74  See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving 
Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 
683, 696 n.37 (2006). 
75  See, e.g., id. 
76  Cf. Dahl, supra note 45, at 202 (“Suppose I stand on a street corner and say to myself, 
‘I command all automobile drivers on this street to drive on the right side of the road’; 
suppose further that all the drivers actually do as I ‘command’ them to do; still, most people 
will regard me as mentally ill if I insist that I have enough power over automobile drivers to 
compel them to use the right side of the road.”).  Dahl stressed that power is the ability to 
convince someone to do something that he or she “would not otherwise do.”  Id. at 203; 
accord WRONG, supra note 44, at 5–6. 
77  See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 74, at 696. 
78  The corporate defense bar sometimes argues along these lines, but the corporate 
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In assessing the magnitude of prosecutorial power, it may be helpful to 
supplement Dahl’s probabilistic measure with what Dennis Wrong calls the 
“intensity” of power: the “limits . . . to the actions which the power holder 
can influence the power subject to perform.”79 The rate at which defendants 
plead guilty is a weak measure of the intensity of prosecutorial power: it 
does not tell us how far prosecutors could push defendants, or what limits 
there are to the consequences defendants would accept as the price of a 
deal. 
It is widely thought that prosecutors have enormous leverage when 
negotiating plea agreements—far more leverage than criminal defendants.80 
This may well be true, but it is difficult to measure the extent of this 
leverage or even to define it with precision.  Sometimes it is suggested that 
prosecutors can dictate whatever outcomes they want, or, equivalently, that 
they have no reason to trade away anything in plea bargaining, because 
going to trial is essentially costless for them: it does not appreciably tax 
their resources, and their risk of losing is insignificant.  That is, at best, an 
exaggeration.  If prosecutors had no incentive to bargain, they would not, 
and they do.  How much they are willing to bargain away is, of course, a 
different question.  The broad consensus among scholars is that prosecutors 
today are able to bargain for the results they want without giving up much 
that is important to them, because the outcomes they can credibly threaten 
under modern sentencing statutes are extraordinarily harsh.81 If that is so, 
however, the fault could be said—and sometimes is said—to lie with the 
sentencing statutes, not with prosecutorial power per se. 
Four more points about prosecutorial power: first, concerns about 
prosecutorial power are bound up with but distinguishable from concerns 
about prosecutorial discretion.  Concerns about prosecutorial power are 
concerns about the prosecutor’s ability to influence or determine the 
outcome of criminal cases; in the context of plea bargaining, concerns about 
prosecutorial power are concerns about the prosecutor’s clout vis-à-vis the 
defendant.  Concerns about prosecutorial discretion are concerns about the 
ability of individual prosecutors, or their offices, to exercise their power 
unilaterally, without checks by other government officials.  Excessive 
prosecutorial power can raise concerns even when prosecutors act within a 
web of constraints imposed by their superiors, by courts, or by other 
 
defense bar is not most people. 
79  WRONG, supra note 44, at 5–6.  This measure obviously makes sense only for what 
Wrong calls “power over.”  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
80  See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 38, at 56. 
81  See, e.g., id.; United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); 
Barkow, supra note 2, at 881; Miller, supra note 37. 
2. SKLANSKY 3/31/2017  2:20 PM 
2016] PROSECUTORIAL POWER 489 
government agencies; even when subject to checks and balances, 
prosecutorial power is a particularly coercive form of government power, 
and therefore worth worrying about.  And there can be concerns about 
prosecutorial discretion even when prosecutorial power is relatively limited: 
even if prosecutors have difficulty securing convictions or securing plea 
bargains, their discretion to forego charging altogether may be troubling.  
Still, the more discretion that prosecutors have, the greater will be the 
concern, generally speaking, about the power they exercise and vice versa.  
Moreover, the line between power and discretion, as I am using those terms, 
is not always sharp.  Mandatory sentencing rules can be understood to 
increase the power of prosecutors by increasing their ability to control the 
outcome of criminal cases,82 but those laws can also be understood as 
increasing prosecutors’ discretion, by eliminating what would otherwise 
function as a judicial check on charging decisions. 
Second, concerns about prosecutorial power and about prosecutorial 
discretion are often intertwined with concerns about prosecutors breaking 
the law.  This is because there are legal constraints on what prosecutors can 
do, curtailing both their power and their discretion, but the constraints are 
often weakly enforced.  For example, prosecutors are required to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defense,83 but when they fail to do so, the 
violation may never come to light, or it may come to light when it is too late 
for the evidence to be useful.84 Prosecutors are prohibited from exercising 
peremptory challenges against prospective jurors on the basis of race or 
gender,85 but proving that they have done so is notoriously difficult.86 It is 
even more difficult to prove that prosecutors have relied on race, ethnicity, 
or political affiliation when making charging decisions, although they are 
prohibited from doing that as well.87 Prosecutorial illegality is objectionable 
in part precisely because it can vitiate constraints on prosecutorial power 
and prosecutorial discretion, but often it is also objectionable on other 
 
82  See, e.g., Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that federal sentencing 
guidelines “did not really increase prosecutors’ discretion, which was already almost 
boundless,” but “increased their power,” because “the choices prosecutors made more 
conclusively determined the sentence”). 
83  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1963). 
84  See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8, at 130–35. 
85  See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1993); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 
84 (1986). 
86  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, New Questions on Racial Gap in Filling Juries, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 2015, at A1. 
87  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–70 (1996); Angela J. Davis, 
Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 210–18 (2007). 
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grounds. 
Third, we have been focusing on the prosecutor’s power to control the 
outcome of particular criminal cases, but prosecutors also have an ability to 
shape criminal justice policy at a broader level.  They get investigatory 
agencies to change their priorities, they block some legislation and push 
through other laws, and they set the agenda for public discussions about 
crime and punishment.88 Elected district attorneys and presidentially-
appointed United States Attorneys, in particular, often serve as de facto 
leaders of the criminal justice system.  Unlike the prosecutor’s control over 
particular criminal cases, which is typically exercised though express or 
implied coercion, the prosecutor’s influence on criminal justice policy 
usually relies on other forms of persuasion, ranging from rhetorical appeals 
to promises of shared prestige.89 The prosecutor’s coercive power is 
typically what people have in mind when they worry about prosecutorial 
power.90 By contrast, when people think of prosecutors as potential 
solutions to the ills of the criminal justice, they often have in mind the 
prosecutor’s ability to influence policy.91 
Fourth and finally, the limitations on the subjects and scope of 
prosecutorial power—despite their gradual loosening—may help to explain 
the expansive magnitude of prosecutorial power.  There is often an inverse 
relationship between the range of power and its weight or intensity, in part 
because of the logistical difficulties created when power is exercised over a 
greater number of people.92 In the case of prosecutors, another factor is at 
work: the fact that prosecutorial power mainly affects criminal defendants 
 
88  See, e.g., Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 
(2014). 
89  In Galbraith’s terms, “conditioned power” or “compensatory power” rather than 
“condign power.”  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
90  But not always: over the past decade, in particular, concerns have often been raised 
about the political power of prosecutors.  See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH 
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A 
CULTURE OF FEAR 33–74 (2007); Bob Egelko, Opinion, Voters, not Law, Determine 
Punishments in California, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 28, 2015) http://www.sfchronicle.com/
opinion/article/Voters-not-law-determine-punishments-in-6471595.php; Barkow, supra note 
2, at 911. 
91  See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 
165–66 (2008). 
92  See WRONG, supra note 44, at 20.  “First, the greater the number of power subjects, 
the greater the difficulty of supervising all of their activities.  Second, the greater the number 
of power subjects, the more extended and differentiated the chain of command necessary to 
control them, creating new subordinate centres of power that can be played off against each 
other and that may themselves become foci of opposition to the integral power-holder.  
Third, the greater the number of subjects, the greater the likelihood of wide variation in their 
attitudes toward the power-holder.”  Id. 
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and criminal suspects means that most people do not imagine that they may 
be subject to prosecutorial power, and they have limited sympathy for the 
people they suppose will wind up in that category.93  That may lead them to 
be more tolerant of concentrating power in the hands of prosecutors than 
they would be if prosecutors made decisions that directly affected things 
other than criminal cases, things that people imagine might wind up 
affecting them.  It does not explain, though, why prosecutors have such 
broad discretion—including the virtually unfettered freedom to decline to 
file charges.  Nor does it explain why American prosecutors, at least, seem 
to have so much more power than the police or than judges in criminal 
cases. 
B. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND UNEXCEPTIONALISM 
Prosecutorial power has long been thought a “uniquely American” 
phenomenon.94 The American prosecutor, it is often said, “has no equal 
throughout the world.”95 “Police, courts, and corrections systems are much 
the same in all developed countries, but prosecutors differ radically,” 
particularly when American prosecutors are compared their counterparts 
overseas.96 
The unparalleled authority of the American prosecutor has often been 
attributed to the fact that district attorneys in the United States are elected, 
county-level officials.  Prosecutorial power, in this view, is an outgrowth of 
the peculiar emphasis the United States places on local, democratic 
control.97 The “locally elected status” of American prosecuting attorneys 
provides them with an “independent source of power” and is the reason 
they enjoy “discretionary privilege unmatched in the world.”98 
This view of prosecutorial power—tying it to the local, democratic 
selection of district attorneys—has always had some weaknesses.  To begin 
with, not all district attorneys in the United States are elected, and there is 
little indication that they are less powerful in the states where they are 
appointed.99 Nor is there any indication that sheriffs, who generally are 
 
93  See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of 
Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused, 
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal 
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 782–83 (2006). 
94  JACOBY, supra note 17, at xv; see also id. at 5–6. 
95  Worrall, supra note 18, at 4. 
96  Tonry, supra note 2, at 1, 5. 
97  See JACOBY, supra note 17, at xvii, xxi, 22–23; Pizzi, supra note 17, at 1343–44. 
98  JACOBY, supra note 17, at xxi, 3. 
99  Chief prosecuting attorneys are appointed by the state attorney general, rather than 
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elected, are more powerful than police chiefs, who generally are appointed.  
All of these officials are locally selected, of course, even if not by popular 
vote, but federal law enforcement officials—including, in particular, United 
States Attorneys—seem at least as powerful as their local counterparts.100 
The biggest problem with tracing prosecutorial power to the local 
election of district attorneys, though, is that American prosecutors no longer 
seem so exceptional. 
European prosecutors, in particular, look more and more like their 
United States counterparts.101 Supervisory power over police investigations 
in Europe is increasingly relocated from investigating magistrates—a 
position in sharp decline—either to prosecutors or to the police 
themselves.102 Meanwhile, prosecutors across Europe have gained new 
powers to negotiate settlements of criminal cases and often to implement 
those settlements with little or no judicial involvement.103 One important 
development in this regard is increased use of the “penal order”—
essentially an adjudication and sentence, typically for a minor offense, 
entirely crafted by the prosecutor.104 In theory, a penal order can be 
appealed to a judge, but in practice, it rarely is; in exchange for foregoing a 
judicial forum the defendant gains a measure of lenience.  For all practical 
purposes, penal orders are thus a form of plea bargaining, a practice that 
European countries used to eschew, at least nominally.105 But “the advance 
 
elected locally, in Alaska, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware and New Jersey.  See 
Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598–99 (2014). 
100  See, e.g., Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and the Federal Criminal Enforcement 
Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236 (2014). 
101  Prosecutors are more powerful in Japan than in Europe or even the United States, but 
Japan in its own ways is a special case, in part because of heavy reliance it places on elite 
bureaucracies more broadly.  See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 3, 48, 127–30 (2002).  The rise of prosecutorial power in 
Europe is harder to explain away. 
102  See Thomas Weigend, A Judge by Another Name? Comparative Perspectives on the 
Role of the Public Prosecutor, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 377, 
378–79 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012). 
103  See id. at 383–87; Jörg-Martin Jehle, The Function of Public Prosecution Within the 
Criminal Justice System: Aim, Approach and Outcome of a European Comparative Study, in 
COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER 
ACROSS EUROPE 3, 6 (Jörg-Martin Jehle & Marianne Wade eds., 2006); Luna & Wade, supra 
note 19, at 1414–15. 
104  See, e.g., Thaman, supra note 43, at 159–73; Josef Zila, Prosecutorial Powers and 
Policy Making in Sweden and the Other Nordic Countries, in THE PROSECUTOR IN 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 235, 249 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012). 
105  See, e.g., Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The 
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004). 
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of negotiated criminal judgments over the last twenty years has been the 
signature development on the European continent,”106 and the “banner-
carrier” in this advance has been the prosecutor, “a ‘standing magistrate’ 
who today looms over his or her ‘sitting’ colleague in the courts both in 
power and importance.”107 
Even in Germany—praised by American scholars a generation ago as a 
“land without plea bargaining”108—consensual case resolutions have 
become the norm,109 and “prosecutors now submit less than 20 percent of 
the cases that cross their desks to the court for a full adjudicative 
hearing.”110 Decisions by German prosecutors today “shape, if not 
determine, outcomes in the vast majority of cases, with the shape of that 
discretion bounded only weakly by the law.”111 
In theory, prosecutors in some European countries still operate under 
the “principle of legality” rather than the “principle of expediency,”112 
which means that they still lack a key aspect of the discretion explicitly 
granted to American prosecutors: the leeway to forego pursuit of a criminal 
case altogether.  However, the legality principle is “far from absolute in 
practice.”113 In Germany, for example, mandatory prosecution is “reserved 
 
106  Weigend, supra note 102, at 387.  See also Langer, supra note 105. 
107  Thaman, supra note 43, at 156.  Prosecutors also loom over judges in significance in 
most if not all of the international criminal tribunals created in recent decades.  Discussions 
of the International Criminal Court, for example, tend to focus heavily on the decisions of its 
chief prosecutor.  See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Is the War Crimes Court Still Relevant?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2015, at SR4. 
108  E.g., John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 
MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 194 (1969). 
109  Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated 
Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 82–83 (2014). 
110  Shawn Boyne, Is the Journey from the In-Box to the Out-Box a Straight Line? The 
Drive for Efficiency and the Prosecution of Low-Level Criminality in Germany, in THE 
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 38 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 
2012) (citing figures by Jehle and Wade). 
111  Id. at 42.  German plea bargaining appears to have begun, slowly at first, in the 
1970s.  See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the 
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (1997); Joachim Herrman, 
Bargaining Justice—A Bargain for German Criminal Justice?, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 755, 755 
(1992). 
112  See Mirjan Damaška, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a 
German Monograph, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 119, 120–21 (1981). 
113  Michele Caianiello, The Italian Public Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Figure in 
Adversarial Proceedings?, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 250, 255 
(Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); see also, e.g., Jehle, supra note 103, at 24. 
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for only the most serious crimes,”114 which makes any difference from the 
United States in this regard largely a matter of form.115 
Three caveats are necessary.  First, prosecutorial authority has 
expanded further in some countries than in others.  In England, Finland, and 
Hungary, for example, prosecutors still submit the majority of the cases that 
cross their desk for full adjudicative resolution.116 England’s Crown 
Prosecution Service has grown “more confident and influential” over the 
past couple of decades, but it is still very far from exercising the kind of 
power that American prosecutors—or, increasingly, Continental 
prosecutors—have over investigations, sentences, and negotiated case-
endings.117 Second, even in countries where prosecutors have gained a 
measure of discretion approaching what they have in the United States, 
their power, in important respects, may remain much more circumscribed, 
simply because the available sanctions in criminal cases are much less 
severe.118 Third, and probably most important, even if the formal authority 
of some European prosecutors now approaches that of their American 
counterparts, the scholarly consensus still tends to see American 
prosecutors as unique—and, usually, as uniquely threatening—both because 
prosecutorial offices in the United States are thought to lack the internal 
bureaucratic safeguards of European prosecution services, and because the 
professional culture of prosecutors in the United States is thought to be less 
professional and more adversarial than in Europe.119 
Still, the growing power of European prosecutors, no matter how 
tamed it is by professional culture and internal oversight, makes it 
increasingly difficult to see prosecutorial power as the straightforward 
consequence of America’s commitment to local, democratic government.  It 
also makes it more important than ever to try to understand why prosecutors 
 
114  Boyne, supra note 107, at 41. 
115  See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RACE AND 
PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 3–4 (2014) (noting that the Manhattan District Attorney’s 
Office “prosecutes nearly all cases brought by the police, including 94 percent of felonies, 96 
percent of misdemeanors, and 89 percent of violations”). 
116  See Boyne, supra note 110, at 38. 
117  Lewis, supra note 20, at 219, 233. 
118  See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Introduction to OVERVIEW AND 
OUTLOOK—TOWARD COMPARATIVE PROSECUTION STUDIES, in THE PROSECUTOR IN 
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 365, 376 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012). 
119  See id.; Damaška, supra note 112, at 136–38; Pizzi, supra note 17, at 1350; Tonry, 
supra note 2, at 7, 17–18.  The same is true when comparing American prosecutors with 
their Japanese counterparts, who are equally if not more powerful, but work more 
collectively and with far more bureaucratic oversight.  See JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 119–
43. 
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have been given so much authority and why they seem to keep 
accumulating more. 
C. PLEA BARGAINING AND CASELOADS 
There is an orthodox explanation for the rise of prosecutorial power 
both in the United States and in Europe, and it is relatively simple.  
Criminal caseloads have risen, overtaxing traditional, trial-based systems of 
adjudication.  That has forced greater and greater reliance on plea 
bargaining, and the reliance on plea bargaining has in turn expanded the 
role and the influence of prosecutors.  The growing power of prosecutors on 
both sides of the Atlantic is attributed to “the intense pressure created by 
overloaded criminal dockets, forcing systems to find means other than full-
fledged trials to deal with their ever-increasing caseloads.”120 
It is easy to see the appeal of this explanation.  Plea bargaining has 
been on the rise for over a century in the United States121 and for the past 
few decades in Europe.122 And plea bargains are simpler and quicker than 
trials, so it seems entirely plausible that burgeoning caseloads lie behind the 
“triumphal march of consensual procedural forms”123 in criminal 
adjudication. 
Nonetheless the argument tracing prosecutorial power to surging 
criminal caseloads has two serious weaknesses.  First, it is not clear that 
plea bargaining has risen in response to rising caseloads, as opposed to vice 
versa.  George Fisher, in his careful history of plea bargaining in the United 
States, takes it as obvious that rising caseloads increase the pressure on 
prosecutors to resolve cases before trial, but he also stresses that caseload 
pressure is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for plea 
bargaining.124 Prosecutors plea bargain whenever they can, partly to reduce 
 
120  Luna & Wade, supra note 118, at 365; see also, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. 
Wright, Reporting for Duty: The Universal Prosecutorial Accountability Puzzle and an 
Experimental Transparency Alternative, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 392, 400 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Boyne, supra note 110, 
at 41; Jehle, supra note 103; Lewis, supra note 20, at 219; Luna & Wade, supra note 19, at 
1439–40; Thaman, supra note 43, at 156; Weigend, supra note 102, at 383, 387; Zila, supra 
note 20, at 249. 
121  See FISHER, supra note 41. 
122  See, e.g., Boyne, supra note 110, at 38; Langer, supra note 105, at 35–62; Thaman, 
supra note 43, at 156. 
123  Thaman, supra note 43, at 156 (quoting Thomas Weigend, Die Reform des 
Strafverfahrens Eu: Europäische und deutsche Tendenzen und Probleme, [The Reform of 
Criminal Proceedings: European and German Trends and Problems], in 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 
DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTWISSENSCHAFT 486, 492 (1992)). 
124  See FISHER, supra note 41, at 44. 
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their workload and partly to avoid the risk of acquittal.125 And once plea 
bargaining begins, it tends to become entrenched by virtue of “its sheer 
efficiency . . . as a means of clearing cases”; it allows caseloads to rise 
without commensurate increases in staffing.126 Because “the cost and 
availability of services, including the services of judges and prosecutors, 
affects demand for them,” caseloads may rise to meet the capacity of the 
adjudication system, in the same way that building more lanes brings more 
cars onto the road.127 Traffic engineers call this the “fundamental law of 
highway congestion”: vehicle-miles traveled increase in direct proportion to 
space on the road.128 And “[a]dding court capacity may work like adding 
highway capacity.”129 
Second, plea bargaining does not necessarily increase prosecutorial 
power.  It may be the result of prosecutorial power, or at least one particular 
form of prosecutorial discretion, namely the discretion to drop charges.  
Alternatively, it may be a sign of prosecutorial weakness: the inability to 
 
125  See, e.g., id. at 90, 178; Vorenberg, supra note 41, at 1532–33.  Accordingly, 
Vorenberg noted that “[e]ven when the docket is manageable, plea bargaining may still be 
used freely.”  Id. at 1533.  Studying Connecticut trial courts several decades ago, Malcolm 
Feeley found no connection between caseloads and rates of plea bargaining.  MALCOLM M. 
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 
244–67 (paperback ed. 1992).  Based on his observations and on a review of English court 
records from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Feeley concluded that plea bargaining 
emerged hand-in-hand with the modern, adversarial criminal trial.  See generally Malcolm 
M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process: The Origins 
of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REV. 183 (1997). 
126  See FISHER, supra note 41, at 176. 
127  Darryl K. Brown, Reforming the Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, in The Future of 
Criminal Law: Working Papers from the 2014 Annual Conference of the Robina Institute of 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, supra note 30, at 75, 84; see also BROWN, supra note 21, 
at 158–64. 
128  Gilles Duranton & Matthew A. Turner, The Fundamental Law of Road Congestion: 
Evidence from US Cities, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2616, 2616 (2011); see also ANTHONY 
DOWNS, STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING WITH PEAK-HOUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION 27–31 (1992). 
129  Brown, supra note 127, at 83.  Rising criminal caseloads are sometimes attributed to 
rising crime rates.  See, e.g., Jehle, supra note 103, at 5; Thaman, supra note 43, at 156.  But 
the chief measures of crime are notoriously unreliable, and the most common measures—
arrests and convictions—are determined in large part by levels of enforcement.  Moreover, 
regardless how they are measured, crime rates are a function of what society chooses to 
classify as criminal, and that decision, too, can be influenced by the case-processing capacity 
of the adjudicatory system.  See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 21, at 158–59.  Rates of 
homicide—a crime with a relatively stable definition and consistently high rates of 
reporting—have been in long-term decline for centuries both in Europe and in North 
America, and the periods of increase do not correlate well with rises in plea bargaining or in 
prosecutorial power.  It is worth noting, too, that the western society with arguably the most 
powerful prosecutors—Japan—has neither high crime rates nor high caseloads.  See 
JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 22–24. 
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proceed to trial with confidence of victory.  But the mere fact that cases are 
resolved consensually does not increase prosecutorial power in any obvious 
way, any more than a rise in civil settlements boosts the power of 
plaintiffs.130 Nor is it immediately clear why prosecutors, as opposed to 
judges or defense attorneys, should be the “banner-carrier”131 in the shift 
away from criminal trials.  Fisher argues that plea bargaining triumphed in 
the United States only because all three principal courtroom actors in the 
criminal courts—prosecutors, defendants, and judges—found it 
advantageous.132 
Occasionally, the growing clout of American prosecutors—or at least 
the failure of courts and legislators to do anything about it—has been 
blamed not on plea bargaining or burgeoning caseloads, but on something 
at once simpler and deeper: the politics of crime.133 Escalating crime rates, 
it has sometimes been suggested, created a one-way ratchet for tougher and 
tougher law enforcement, and giving prosecutors more leeway was just part 
of the package.134 But prosecutors have been accumulating power for more 
than a century; the trend began well before the emergence of the late 
twentieth century “culture of control.”135 Furthermore, the waning fear of 
crime in recent years136 has done nothing to reverse the growth of 
prosecutorial power.  Over the past decade all kinds of proposals have 
gained traction for making American criminal justice less punitive and 
heavy-handed, from restrictions on investigative stops to lower sentences, 
expanded opportunities for parole, and lower hurdles for clemency.137 In a 
small but noteworthy number of recent cases, elected prosecutors made 
promises that not long ago might have been political suicide: less punitive 
policies, greater vigilance against wrongful convictions, or more scrutiny of 
 
130  See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 125, at 221 (suggesting that plea bargaining may have 
“expanded and not contracted the powers of the accused”); cf. Barkow, supra note 2, at 909–
10 (arguing that a reduction or elimination of plea bargaining would not significantly reduce 
prosecutorial power, because “[i]f charging discretion exists, so does the power to 
adjudicate”). 
131  Thaman, supra note 43, at 156. 
132  See FISHER, supra note 41, at 110, 178, 198–200. 
133  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 2, at 884–87, 910, 912–13, 921. 
134  See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 90, at 33–34, 53–60, 70–74, 102. 
135  DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 1–26 (2001). 
136  See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2006); 
David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 35 
(2011). 
137  See, e.g., JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. ET AL., SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN LEADERS SPEAK OUT 
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Inimai Chettiar & Michael Waldman eds., 2015); Jennifer Steinhauer, 
Bipartisan Push Builds to Relax Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2015, at A1. 
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the police.138 But neither prosecutorial power nor prosecutorial discretion 
has been significantly curtailed. 
Sometimes the rise of prosecutorial power has been attributed not to 
plea bargaining and not to the politics of crime but to “the growing 
complexity” of the criminal justice system.139 This is said to make it harder 
for judges to supervise prosecutors,140 harder for judges rather than 
prosecutors to supervise the police,141 and easier for prosecutors to steer 
cases to the outcomes they think appropriate.142  The complexity 
explanation, like the caseloads explanation and the fear-of-crime 
explanation, is radically incomplete.  One wants to know what it is about 
prosecutors that makes them outcompete judges and other officials in an 
environment of complexity.  But focusing on complexity sends us down the 
right path. 
II. INTERMEDIATION 
If virtually every discussion of prosecutors begins with their power, 
most soon take note of one or another organizational or conceptual divide 
that prosecutors seem to bestride.  Prosecutors “straddle a line that separates 
courts from politics.”143 They operate “in a dual capacity . . . as both 
attorney and client.”144 They “ha[ve] always been situated in an 
(uncomfortable) tug and pull between the partisan advocacy sphere of trial 
and impartial justice-seeking.”145 They exercise “both executive and judicial 
power,”146 playing “a quasi-magisterial role, somewhere between police 
officer and judge.”147 It is rare for more than one of these boundary 
crossings to be noted in the same argument, and usually the ambiguity of 
the prosecutor’s role is mentioned only in passing, as a kind of expository 
 
138  See David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected 
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2017). 
139  Caianiello, supra note 113, at 255; see also Weigend, supra note 102, at 384.  
140  See Damaška, supra note 112, at 130. 
141  See Weigend, supra note 102, at 379. 
142  See id. at 384. 
143  Worrall, supra note 18, at 4. 
144  People v. Kelley, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (Ct. App. 1977). 
145  Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial 
Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 823 (2014); see also, e.g., Cheney v. 
United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) (noting that a 
prosecutor is obligated “not only to win and zealously to advocate for his client but also to 
serve the cause of justice”).  
146  Barkow, supra note 36, at 1048. 
147  JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 193 (Christine Cardone ed., 3d ed. 1994). 
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scaffolding, the way a guidebook might describe some travel destination as 
a “land of many contrasts.”148 On other occasions the category-defying 
nature of prosecutors is stressed as a way of underscoring how poorly they 
fit within the legal order they are supposed to serve.149 
I want to suggest something different here: that boundary-blurring is 
central rather than incidental to the prosecutor’s role and a critical part of 
the explanation for the growth of prosecutorial power.  I will start by 
discussing three particularly important divides that prosecutors bridge: 
between adversarial and inquisitorial justice, between the police and the 
courts, and between law and discretion.  The first and third of these divides 
are conceptual and the second is organizational, but each will help to 
demonstrate, I hope, the extent to which prosecutors operate as “mediating 
figures,”150 akin in some ways to the “ritual specialists”151 and other 
“culture-brokers”152 who, anthropologists tell us, “negotiate different social 
interests” by “tread[ing] across natural and cultural boundaries.”153  After 
discussing the ways in which prosecutors soften the adversarial/inquisitorial 
divide, bridge the gap between law enforcement and adjudication, and 
straddle the line between law and discretion, I will try to specify the 
functions that prosecutors serve by blurring these boundaries, and the ways 
in which the mediating nature of the prosecutor’s role can help to explain 
the rise of prosecutorial power.  The growing complexity of criminal justice 
systems will be part of that explanation. 
A. ADVERSARIAL AND INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE 
It is hard to think of a distinction more fundamental in criminal 
procedure, more venerable, or more frequently invoked, than the divide 
between adversarial and inquisitorial forms of justice.  American lawyers, 
in particular, tend to treat their system’s commitment to adversarial 
justice—and its rejection of the inquisitorial system—as its central defining 
feature; certainly the lawyers who sit on the Supreme Court of the United 
 
148  But cf. JACOBY, supra note 17, at xv (remarking that “[t]he prosecutor has a vague 
image in the public eye, and much of this arises because the prosecutor’s own self-image is 
fuzzy”). 
149  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 36, at 1048; Caianiello, supra note 113, at 266; Luna, 
supra note 37, at 57. 
150  Susan J. Rasmussen, Only Women Know Trees: Medicine Women and the Role of 
Herbal Healing in Tuareg Culture, 54 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 147, 147 (1998).  
151  Id. 
152  Susan J. Rasmussen, When the Field Space Comes to the Home Space: New 
Constructions of Ethnographic Knowledge in a New African Diaspora, 76 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 7, 7 (2003). 
153  Rasmussen, supra note 150, at 147; see also id. at 154. 
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States often think this way.154 Europeans sometimes identify their systems 
as inquisitorial; more often they see them as combining elements of both 
the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions.155 Either way, though, European 
discussions of criminal procedure also tend to be shaped by the distinction 
between adversarial and inquisitorial institutions, although not always so 
strongly as in the United States. 
While it is notoriously difficult to pin down the differences between 
adversarial and inquisitorial justice—there is a fair amount of vagueness in 
the way the terms are defined156—the core distinction, it is generally agreed, 
is between forms of adjudication that rely on a contest between two 
adversaries and those that depend instead on an official, impartial 
inquiry.157  Prosecutors are conspicuously difficult to categorize within this 
scheme.  The prosecutor is a kind of “impartial party,”158 with a “dual role 
as an advocate for the government and as an administrator of justice.”159 It 
has long been “customary to note that while prosecutors act as the 
government’s representative in the adversary system, they are expected to 
be more (or is it less?) than an adversary.”160 One consequence of this in-
between status is that prosecutors are only loosely regulated by the rules of 
professional conduct promulgated by bar associations: “[f]ew professional 
conduct provisions specifically target their work, and those provisions are 
mostly undemanding,” and “[c]ourts often interpret the generally applicable 
 
154  See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1636–38 
(2009). 
155  See id. at 1640; MAŁGORZATA WĄSEK-WIADEREK, THE PRINCIPLE OF “EQUALITY OF 
ARMS” IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS FUNCTIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF SELECTED EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 48 (2000). 
156  See Sklansky, supra note 154, at 1639, 1680–83. 
157  See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 3 (1986); Langer, supra note 105, at 17. 
158  Caianiello, supra note 113, at 251 (quoting Pietro Calamandrei). 
159  Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 51–52 (1998); see also, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 
cmt. (2007) (noting that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not 
simply that of an advocate”); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (2015) (describing the prosecutor as “an administrator of 
justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court”); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial 
Constitutionalism, S. CAL. L. REV (forthcoming 2016) (noting that “[p]rosecutors in the 
American system play an odd double role” as “partisan advocates” and as “neutral 
implementer[s] of  constitutional protections”). 
160  Vorenberg, supra note 41, at 1557; cf. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, pt. 1 cmt. 
(Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n 2009) (noting that “[a] prosecutor is not a mere advocate”); 
Miller & Wright, supra note 91, at 178 (describing the prosecutor as “something more than a 
litigant who operates ‘in the shadow of the law’”). 
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rules of professional conduct as less restrictively applied to prosecutors than 
to other lawyers.”161  Another consequence—more to the present point—is 
that prosecutors “soften the distinction” between adversarial and 
inquisitorial forms of justice162; the more prominent a role the prosecutor 
plays in a system of criminal adjudication, the more difficult it is to 
categorize that system as clearly adversarial or clearly inquisitorial.  
Prosecutors therefore complicate the self-conception of legal systems on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
In adversarial systems, the prosecutor often appears as an anomaly: 
“an inquisitorial figure in adversarial proceedings.”163 This is notably true in 
the United States, where prosecutors, at least in the pretrial stage, are often 
described as performing an “essentially . . . inquisitorial” role164—and 
frequently faulted for performing it with a mindset that is too adversarial.165 
 
161  Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
873, 873–74 (2012); see also, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8, at 143–54.  The only provision of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct directly addressing prosecutors, Rule 3.8, says 
nothing about the proper exercise of charging discretion, aside from suggesting that charges 
should satisfy the undemanding standard of “probable cause.”  Nor does the rule discuss 
prosecutors’ “conduct before the grand jury, relations with the police and other law 
enforcement officers, [or] relations with victims and government witnesses.”  DAVIS, supra 
note 8, at 147.  Some of these latter matters are addressed in separate standards the ABA has 
issued for prosecutors, see PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 13, and in guidelines 
developed by the National District Attorneys Association, see NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 13, but both sets of standards are non-binding and largely anodyne.  
On the critical question of charging discretion, for example, the ABA standards prohibit 
filing charges that are based on “partisan political pressure or professional ambition or 
improper personal considerations,” or that cannot “reasonably . . . be substantiated by 
admissible evidence at trial.”  Other than that, pretty much anything is fair game.  See 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 13, at standard 
3-4.4.  The NDAA’s standards are more or less similar, see NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 13, at §§ 4-1.3 & 4-1.4, as are the “Principles of Federal 
Prosecution” promulgated by the United States Department of Justice, see UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.200–.760 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1997).  The Principles of 
Federal Prosecution do take up the controversial and hugely important question of whether 
and in what way prosecutors should take potential penalties into account in selecting 
charges, but what they on that subject is so convoluted and contradictory it offers little 
genuine guidance.  See id. § 9-27.300; David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the 
Prosecutor’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 533–36 (1999).  
162  Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV.  1673, 1674 (2015). 
163  Caianiello, supra note 113, at 251 (describing Italian prosecutors); see also, e.g., 
Bibas, supra note 37, at 994 (describing American prosecutors as “not mere partisan 
advocates, but officers of the court”). 
164  Lynch, supra note 162, at 1674; see also, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 
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165  See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8; Tonry, supra note 2.  Increasingly, American 
2. SKLANSKY 3/31/2017  2:20 PM 
502 SKLANSKY [Vol. 106 
But at other times, American prosecutors are criticized for being 
insufficiently adversarial in their handling of investigations: this was the 
gravamen of many of the complaints in 2014 after prosecutors in Missouri 
and New York failed to secure indictments of white police officers who had 
killed unarmed black men.166 In systems within the inquisitorial tradition, 
meanwhile, prosecutors are often understood as advocates, at least at the 
trial stage.  How else to make sense of the longstanding European 
commitment to “equality of arms” in criminal procedure,167 or the repeated 
insistence by the European Court of Human Rights on a sharp “separation 
of the duties of accusation and adjudication,”168 prohibiting an official from 
acting both as prosecutor and judge in the same case?169 The European 
prosecutor is often described as, in theory, “a detached ‘guardian of the 
law’”170—a “judicial” officer “operating under the same professional 
obligations of balance and fairness . . . that apply to judges.”171 The reality, 
though—repeatedly acknowledged by European scholars—is that once an 
accusation is filed, the European prosecutor, like his or her American 
counterpart, “is cast in the role of the accuser, seeking to persuade the court 
of the defendant’s guilt rather than to neutrally present evidence in a 
detached fashion.”172  The fairness of adjudicatory proceedings, a leading 
scholar of continental criminal proceeding has stressed, “is not as such 
endangered by a partial prosecutor.  One might be tempted to argue to the 
contrary.”173 
B. POLICE AND COURTS 
One reason it is plausible to see prosecutors either as adversarial or 
 
prosecutors are also taking on an inquisitorial role at the back end of the adjudicatory 
process, forming “conviction integrity units” to assess claims of innocence from convicted 
defendants.  See, e.g., Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial 
Ethics and the Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613, 627–45; Laurie L. 
Levenson, The Problem With Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: Rethinking a Prosecutor’s 
Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335, 369–70, 385 (2015). 
166  See supra the discussion accompanying note 9. 
167  See JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF 
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 83 (2012); 
WĄSEK-WIADEREK, supra note 155, at 23, 48, 50; Jiri Toman, The Role of the Public 
Prosecution Office in the Criminal Field, in THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION OFFICE 
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 123, 128, 132–33 (1997). 
168  STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 67 (2005). 
169  See id. at 100–02. 
170  Weigend, supra note 102, at 382. 
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inquisitorial figures is that they “provide the link between police 
investigation and courtroom adjudication”174—between “zealous 
officers . . . engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime”175 and “neutral and detached”176 judicial personnel.  Prosecutors are 
the “gatekeepers”177 of the criminal justice system; they oversee “the 
transition from the investigative phase to adjudication in court,”178 playing 
“a quasi-magisterial role, somewhere between police officer and judge.”179  
They have a foot in each camp.  On the one hand, they work closely with 
law enforcement officers and often see themselves as investigators and 
crime fighters,180 on the other hand, like judges they are trained in the law 
and are “officers of the court”181; in some civil law systems, they share the 
same occupational status as judges.182 
Because they pass back and forth between these two worlds, 
prosecutors are relied upon both to bring the police within the rule of law 
and to make the rule of law compatible with the realities of policing.  
Prosecutors present and defend the work of the police in court, but they also 
explain and legitimize the law to the police, and—in varying degrees—
supervise the police to ensure they comply with the law.183 They are 
envoys—“culture-brokers”184—between the realm of the judges and the 
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domain of law enforcement, between the courtroom and the squad room. 
Prosecutors thus mediate between courts and police in at least two 
different ways.  First, the prosecutor’s duties contain elements both of law 
enforcement and adjudication: on the one hand the prosecutor helps to 
direct police operations and works to secure criminal convictions; on the 
other hand the prosecutor decides which cases to move forward and which 
cases to drop, and—more and more, in an era of global plea bargaining—
the prosecutor “has become a ‘judge before the judge,’” determining 
“whether a sanction will be imposed and how severe or lenient that sanction 
will be.”185 Second, because their work requires them to travel back and 
forth between the world of the policing and the world of the courtroom, 
talking on a daily basis with officers and with judges, they serve to explain 
the occupants of each world to those of the other, bridging a cultural divide 
and “negotiat[ing] different social interests.”186 They are translators and 
organizational intermediaries. 
C. LAW AND DISCRETION 
In addition to blurring the distinction between adversarial and 
inquisitorial forms of justice, and bridging the gap between the police and 
the courts, prosecutors straddle the divide between law and discretion.  Here 
is former Attorney General Eric Holder, explaining in 2009 how the United 
States Department of Justice would make the politically explosive decision 
whether to prosecute officials of the previous Administration who had 
authorized or carried out torture: “We are going to follow the evidence, 
follow the law and take that where it leads.  No one is above the law.”187 
That could have been virtually any prosecutor discussing almost any case; 
prosecutors routinely wrap themselves in the mantle of the law.  But the 
American criminal justice system also relies heavily and explicitly on the 
prosecutor’s leeway to forego enforcement: “[t]he rigors of the penal 
system are . . . mitigated by the responsible exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.”188 “Although we expect prosecutors to follow the law, nobody 
believes that prosecutors in the United States only follow the law—
discretionary application of criminal law is central to the prosecutor’s 
role.”189 Civil law countries that follow the “legality” principle do expect 
 
185  Weigend, supra note 102, at 378; see also Jehle, supra note 103, at 6; Luna & Wade, 
supra note 19, at 1427. 
186  Rasmussen, supra note 150, at 147. 
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prosecutors to “only follow the law,” at least in theory, but there are fewer 
of those countries today.190 And even the holdouts, it is widely 
acknowledged, riddle the legality principle with exceptions, some official 
and others unwritten.191 
Every government functionary in every criminal justice system 
navigates between law and discretion, of course.  But police work involves 
vastly more discretion than law, and pretty much the opposite is true of 
judging.  Police discretion is hemmed in only at the margins by legal 
constraints192; judicial discretion, by and large, operates in the interstices of 
the law.  Prosecutors, midway between the world of law enforcement and 
the world of the courts, move more fluidly between law and discretion than 
either police officers or judges.  No police officer today could ever claim 
simply to be following the law and expect to be taken seriously, and few 
judges would assert the authority, let alone the responsibility, to decline to 
enforce a criminal law simply because it seems, in the circumstances, 
inappropriate. 
Prosecutors, in contrast, constantly mediate between law and 
discretion; they are expected to “be accountable both to the people and to 
their laws.”193 Mixing law and discretion is a deep and longstanding feature 
of their job, especially in the United States.  Prosecutors became salaried 
workers in the nineteenth century, Nicholas Parrillo has shown, precisely 
“so that they would have the financial independence to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion”; legislators wanted prosecutors to “‘sand off’ the 
hard edges of modern positivist legislation (which was inevitably broad and 
rigid) and thereby vest it with legitimacy.”194 By mediating between law 
and discretion, prosecutors thus also blurred the boundary between the 
lawful and the prohibited. 
In Parrillo’s account, prosecutorial discretion was critical in securing 
acceptance of “alien imposition”: directives running contrary to “shared 
social expectations,” issued by a “sovereign external to the community.”195 
He takes laws of this kind to be “largely synonymous with modernity,” and 
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he contrasts them with “familiar imposition,” an older form of governance 
in which “the enforcer, the enforcee, and the norm being imposed all had 
reference to a single face-to-face community.”196  This makes prosecutors 
intermediaries in still another sense as well: they served—and continue to 
serve—to reconcile the populace with a distant sovereign.  They do that in 
part by tempering law with discretion and softening the edges between the 
lawful and the prohibited.  They can accomplish those tasks because they 
bridge the world of the police and the world of the courts—which also helps 
them blur the boundary between adversarial and inquisitorial forms of 
justice. 
D. FLEXIBILITY AND COMPLEXITY. 
Why would officials who are first and foremost mediating figures 
come to dominate criminal justice, first in the United States and more 
recently in Europe?  Perhaps because modern criminal justice systems have 
come to rely, more and more, on intermediation.  The boundary-blurring 
performed by prosecutors provides the legal order with three different kinds 
of flexibility: ideological, institutional, and operational. 
By ideological flexibility, I mean the ability of a system to fudge on its 
commitments.  The story that Parrillo tells, about prosecutors legitimating 
alien imposition by blunting the edges of positivist prohibitions, is a story 
of prosecutors letting the legal system equivocate: letting it prohibit conduct 
without actually penalizing it, letting it insist on a “government of law not 
of men” without requiring rigid enforcement of the laws.197 More recently, 
prosecutorial discretion has allowed legislators to act “tough on crime” 
without worrying much about the consequences: prosecutors have been 
trusted to ensure that draconian penalties are imposed only on those who 
truly deserve them.198 Blurring the boundary between adversarial and 
inquisitorial forms of justice facilitates a different kind of ideological 
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flexibility: it allows a system to declare itself proudly “adversarial” or 
“inquisitorial” without living with all the consequences. 
Prosecutors provide institutional flexibility by bridging courts and 
police, allowing the two organizations to function separately but in a 
coordinated manner.  The separation of functions between the police and 
the courts is itself, in part, a strategy for reconciling antagonistic 
allegiances—specifically, the dueling commitments to what Herbert 
Packard called the “crime control model” and “due process model” of 
criminal justice.199  We want to be safe from crime, but we also want 
criminal suspects and criminal defendants to be treated fairly—the way we 
ourselves would wish to be treated were we suspected or accused of 
breaking the law.  We deal with this tension in part by division of 
responsibility: the police are charged with controlling crime, and the courts 
with ensuring due process.  Each agency pursues its separate mission, so 
that neither set of values gets lost.200 
That is the theory.  In practice, judges often care a great deal about 
crime control, and there are police officers who think a lot about fairness.  
More to the point, the mounting complexity of criminal justice work makes 
it progressively harder to maintain this separation of functions and still have 
a system that works.  Judges know less and less about what the police work 
is like, and the police have a more and more attenuated sense of the 
intellectual and professional world of judges.201 Mutual incomprehension 
makes it increasingly hard for judges to oversee police work unilaterally, 
and for the police, on their own, to ensure that their cases will hold up in 
court, or even enter the system.  Each side relies on envoys to the other, and 
the envoys are prosecutors.  Prosecutors make it possible for the courts and 
the police to remain separate agencies with divergent missions, and they 
therefore make it possible for the system to maintain its concurrent 
commitments to crime control and to due process.  The organizational 
flexibility provided by prosecutors thus itself facilitates a certain kind of 
ideological flexibility. 
By blurring boundaries, prosecutors also provide the criminal justice 
system with operational flexibility: the ability to change practices on the fly 
in response to new challenges.  Because prosecutors stand at the gateway to 
the criminal justice system, mediating between the police and courts, and 
because they are both agents of the law and vested with wide discretion, 
they are able to redirect the energies of the criminal justice system, to 
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recalibrate its severity, and to change its tactics.  They can make these 
changes rapidly, in individual cases and at the wholesale level.  Prosecutors 
can tailor charges, plea offers, and sentencing recommendations to 
particular defendants.  They can go further and offer to defer criminal 
prosecution altogether if an individual or an organization agrees to . . . well, 
pretty much to whatever terms the prosecutor thinks appropriate. By 
aggregating many such decisions, or by adopting explicit policies to guide 
their discretion, prosecutors can steer the entire criminal justice system in 
new directions.  There is evidence, for example, that the bulk of the sharp 
increase in levels of incarceration in the United States over the past several 
decades has been caused by prosecutors exercising their discretion to file 
more charges.202 Similarly, prosecutors have been responsible for the 
decision to suspend enforcement, for all practical purposes, of federal 
marijuana laws in states that repealed their own prohibitions of marijuana 
use.203  The nationwide ramp-up in charging appears to have been the result 
of many retail-level decisions, whereas the change in federal marijuana 
enforcement policy took the form of explicit guidelines adopted by the 
Department of Justice.  In each case, though, prosecutors were able to 
redirect the operations of the criminal justice system through the exercise of 
their discretion. 
When prosecutors are lauded for taking a “data-driven,”204 “Moneyball 
approach”205 to crime—in large part through the calculated use of what used 
to be called pretextual prosecutions—they are being praised for, among 
other things, using their flexibility.  They are being applauded for breaking 
free from ideological constraints, rigid institutional boundaries, and 
operational inertia.  The very substitution of terms like “intelligence-led 
prosecution” for the older, more pejorative label of “pretextual prosecution” 
is a sign of the broad changes in legal culture that have made the boundary-
blurring carried out by prosecutors increasingly valuable, or at least 
increasingly valued.  Another sign is the growing tendency for prosecutors, 
with all their intermediating abilities, to be held up as the models for new, 
more flexible approaches to governance outside the criminal context.  Thus, 
for example, the Obama Administration broke the logjam over immigration 
reform through a series of bureaucratic changes it defended as exercises of 
“prosecutorial discretion” in immigration enforcement.206 Critics 
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complained that the new immigration rules departed from how prosecutors 
actually operated, but—tellingly—almost no one in this debate suggested 
that prosecutorial discretion was itself a bad thing, something to be avoided 
rather than emulated.207 
It is difficult to pinpoint the social changes that have put a growing 
premium on boundary-blurring in the criminal process and in the legal 
system more broadly, but the explanation may well have to do with rising 
legal complexity, and it almost certainly has to do with an increasing 
preference for flexibility over institutional rigidity and hard-and-fast 
commitments.  As the sheer volume of legal rules and legal institutions has 
grown, as legal rules have become progressively easier to access, and as 
mechanisms have proliferated for invoking and enforcing legal rules, the 
play in the joints previously provided by gaps in information and severe 
limitations on the opportunities for appeal has likely diminished; rigid 
formalism is harder to live with the more seriously and thoroughly it is 
implemented.208  That may be why the new enthusiasm for pretextual 
prosecutions is part of a broader shift toward a preference for ad hoc 
instrumentalism in the exercise of government power.  Regardless of 
underlying cause, though, the broader shift seems clear.209 And prosecutors 
are ad hoc instrumentalists par excellence. 
Similarly, Anne O’Connell has pointed out the regulatory flexibility 
provided by “boundary organizations”—government agencies straddling 
the divides between public and private; between the federal government and 
states, foreign nations, and Indian tribes; and between the legislative, 
judicial, and executive branches.210  Her account strongly suggests 
(although she does not explicitly claim) that the organizations she describes 
have proliferated over the past century.  Prosecutors’ offices muddy the 
separation of executive from judicial power, so they fit snugly within 
O’Connell’s definition of boundary organizations—maybe the only 
category within which they fit snugly.  But prosecutors also muddy other 
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important divides, as I have tried to show.  O’Connell focuses on agencies 
that have “migrated” toward a boundary or were placed by Congress at a 
boundary so that they could carry out their mission more effectively.211 For 
prosecutors, though, we might say that boundary-crossing is the mission. 
Ad hoc instrumentalism and boundary organizations, in turn, are parts 
of a still larger movement toward greater flexibility and fluidity in 
governance, a movement that includes the broad categories of negotiated 
rulemaking,212  “unorthodox lawmaking,”213 and—most capacious of all—
“new governance.”214  Each of these developments has been celebrated as a 
way to respond to greater legal complexity, and each does so in part by 
evading or transcending traditional jurisprudential taxonomies.  The 
“blurring of boundaries pervades new governance,” for example, and has 
been plausibly called one of its “signature strengths.”215 Again, however, 
prosecutors go one better.  New governance is increasingly faulted for 
leaving no space for “adversarial legalism,”216 whereas the binaries bridged 
by prosecutors, as we have seen, include the divide between adversarialism 
and rival approaches to criminal justice. 
III. REFORM 
One reason why scholarship on prosecutors, at least in the United 
States, has tended to be pragmatic and reformist is that American 
prosecutorial agencies have long seemed, to most scholars, in urgent need 
of reform.  Since the mid-twentieth century if not earlier, “[t]he American 
prosecutor has been under nearly constant attack in the criminal procedure 
literature.”217 The core concern is that prosecutors have too much power 
and too much discretion, that they are anomalies in a scheme of limited 
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government, separation of powers, and rule of law.  If prosecutors are first 
and foremost mediating figures, though, if they have accumulated power 
precisely because of their unrivalled ability to blur boundaries within 
criminal justice, then reforming prosecutors’ offices is trickier business than 
is often suggested, or at least a different kind of business.  Many, if not 
most, of the proposals for taming prosecutorial power aim to bring 
prosecutors’ offices in line with other, more traditional government 
agencies by clarifying and narrowing the prosecutor’s job: limiting the 
prosecutor’s discretion,218 or making the prosecutor more clearly 
adversarial219 or more explicitly inquisitorial,220 or having judges oversee 
prosecutors the way judges oversee police officers,221 or making 
prosecutors more like judges,222 or separating functions within a 
prosecutors’ office.223 These are all efforts to stop prosecutors from blurring 
boundaries so much.  They may be sensible proposals, but they push against 
a strong current.  Prosecutors blur boundaries not because they have 
grabbed power,224 and not because the ambiguity of their role has escaped 
notice, but because boundary blurring has been what we have wanted 
prosecutors to do—and, increasingly, what we want other officials to do as 
well. 
Whether we should want prosecutors to intermediate as much as they 
do is a different question.  Boundary blurring and the flexibility that it 
facilitates have serious costs, and they can take a particular toll on 
transparency and accountability.  This is true of “unorthodox lawmaking” 
and its analogs in the rulemaking context (including negotiated 
rulemaking), which “bypass the hurdles of transparency” imposed by 
traditional legislative and regulatory processes and can “obfuscate 
accountability.”225 It is true of new governance: that is why discussions of 
new governance spend so much time designing and assessing new forms of 
accountability.226 It is plainly true of prosecutors, as well.  Many if not most 
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of the concerns raised about prosecutors pertain to the “accountability 
deficit” under which they operate,227 and that deficit comes, in significant 
part, from the mediating nature of the prosecutor’s role.  But the connection 
between accountability concerns and prosecutorial boundary-blurring has 
not always been recognized. 
In theory, American prosecutors operate under two separate forms of 
oversight: as elected officials, they answer to the public, and as legal 
officers, they are accountable to the law.228 Because prosecutors “straddle a 
line that separates courts from politics,”229 they are subject to “a complex 
set of constraints.”230 In practice, though, neither half of this set of 
constraints seems to operate effectively.  Prosecutors seem accountable 
neither to the electorate nor to the legal system, in part exactly because of 
the hybrid nature of their authority.  The “locally elected status” of 
American prosecutors gives legitimacy to their broad, virtually 
unreviewable discretion,231 while the technical nature of their work helps to 
make public assessments of their performance superficial and often 
perfunctory: prosecutors who seek reelection are rarely unsuccessful.232 In a 
similar way, prosecutors escape serious regulation through rules of 
professional discipline, because prosecutors seem “fundamentally different 
from . . . lawyers who represent clients,”233 and they escape close 
supervision by the judiciary in part because they are advocates, not judges, 
and “amenab[le] to professional discipline” by the bar.234 
The American legal tradition has often sought to constrain power not 
through “accountability,” either to the public or to the law, but instead 
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through checks and balances, relying on “[a]mbition . . . to counteract 
ambition.”235  But prosecutorial boundary-blurring seems to confound the 
separation of powers, as well.  Prosecutors exercise “both executive and 
judicial power—posing the very danger the Framers tried to prevent.”236 
Indeed, prosecutors do not just have authority both to “execute the law” and 
to “adjudicate matters”; they also may be said to “legislate criminal law, 
setting the penal code’s effective scope” through their collective exercise of 
discretion.237 
Faced with the difficulty of reconciling the realities of prosecutorial 
power with the aspirations of a constitutional democracy, reformers 
generally have pursued one of two paths—or, most often, some 
combination of them.  The first is to make prosecutors more responsive to 
the public.  The typical strategy for achieving this is either increased 
transparency238 or, less commonly, some combination of decentralization 
and community outreach.239 The second path is to make prosecutors more 
accountable to law, either through outside oversight (to courts, bar 
associations, or special disciplinary boards)240 or by strengthening of rule-
of-law norms inside prosecutors’ offices.241 The first path tries to enhance 
democratic control of prosecutors; the second is often (but not always) 
motivated in part by a desire to insulate prosecutors from politics. 
The two paths actually do not diverge very far.  In fact, the three most 
striking things about the reform programs that have been put forward over 
the past half-century for addressing prosecutorial power are how similar 
they have been to each other, how relatively modest they have been in their 
ambitions, and how unsuccessful they have been in achieving even their 
limited goals. 
There has been a strong amount of consensus among scholars, 
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stretching back to the 1970s, that prosecutors’ offices should be reformed in 
the following ways: discretion should be constrained by internally 
promulgated guidelines.  Prosecutors should provide reasons for their 
decisions.  Defendants should have opportunities to be heard before those 
decisions are made.  And there should be meaningful mechanisms of 
internal oversight and review.  Four or five decades ago, the scholars 
making these proposals generally hoped they would be adopted through 
some combination of professionalism among prosecutors and prodding 
from courts and legislatures242; today, scholars tend to place their hopes in 
some combination of professionalism among prosecutors and prodding 
from the community.243 That aside, the package of reform proposals has 
stayed largely constant.244 
It is a relatively mild package.  Despite the fact that prosecutors’ 
offices as we now know them are relatively new institutions, dating back at 
most to the late nineteenth century, there are no calls to abolish the 
institution or to alter its core characteristics.  Reformers uniformly stress 
that they seek to impose only “decent” limitations on prosecutors245; they 
have no quarrel with prosecutorial discretion, only with its “idiosyncratic” 
use246; they do not want or expect rigid adherence to guidelines, just 
“tolerable consistency.”247  Prosecutors’ offices will by and large be left 
with all of their powers.  They will just have to exercise those powers a 
little more thoughtfully, a little less haphazardly, and with a little more 
accountability. 
Nonetheless, even this consensus package of minimal, prosecutor-
friendly reforms has proven unattainable.  One reason why the current 
generation of scholars has soured on judicial oversight as a tool of 
prosecutorial reform is that it never seemed to go anywhere.  Controls over 
 
242  See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1971); Leland E. Beck, The Administrative Law of Criminal 
Prosecution: The Development of Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 310 (1978); 
DAVIS, supra note 108; Vorenberg, supra note 41. 
243  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 37; Fish, supra note 159; Gold, supra note 8; Miller & 
Wright, supra note 91. 
244  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 2, at 914; Vorenberg, supra note 41, at 1545 (showing 
that this program seeks in part to centralize and rationalize the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion).  It runs contrary in some ways to “community prosecution,” which decentralizes 
decision-making and downplays concerns about consistency.  But community prosecution 
has remained a marginal phenomenon, far more significant in campaign rhetoric than in 
operations on the ground. 
245  Vorenberg, supra note 41, at 1521. 
246  Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. Rev. 369, 371 (2010). 
247  Abrams, supra note 242, at 7 (quotations in original). 
2. SKLANSKY 3/31/2017  2:20 PM 
2016] PROSECUTORIAL POWER 515 
prosecutors have not strengthened; “what has changed, if anything, is that 
prosecutors now have even more power.”248 The use of guidelines is 
“sporadic,” and “[m]ost prosecutor offices do not ask their attorneys to 
record any reasons for their decisions.”249 Judicial review of charging 
decisions and plea bargains remains virtually nonexistent.  At the close of 
the 1960s, Kenneth Culp Davis noted with bewilderment the 
universally accepted assumptions . . . that the prosecuting power must of course be 
discretionary, that statutory provisions as to what enforcement officers “shall” do may 
be freely violated without disapproval from the public or from other officials, that 
determinations to prosecute or not to prosecute may be made secretly without any 
statement of findings or reasons, that such decisions by a top prosecutor of a city or 
county or state usually need not be reviewable by any other administrative authority, 
and that decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute are not judicially reviewable for 
abuse of discretion.250 
He could not see any reason for these assumptions other than “unplanned 
evolution” and a lack of critical reflection,251 but half a century on they 
seem hardly shaken, at least among legislators and judges. 
Hence the turn among scholars toward the possibility of democratic 
oversight.  The thought has been that although the United States lacks the 
strong civil service tradition of Europe, maybe our own, distinctive political 
traditions offer homegrown answers to the problem of prosecutorial power.  
For us, perhaps, local election of prosecutors is a feature, not a bug.  The 
trick is simply to unleash the power of elections to prod prosecutors to self-
regulate.252 
It has long seemed apparent, though, that the “political check is not 
working.”253 It seemed apparent to Kenneth Davis and others fifty years 
ago–that is why they turned to courts and legislators.254 It has seemed 
apparent to the scholars who have written more recently about prosecutors, 
as well.  Voters rarely turn prosecutors out of office, and campaign rhetoric 
when prosecutors seek election or reelection tends to focus on personalities 
rather than on policies.255 Part of the problem has seemed to be that the 
public has little information about how well prosecutorial offices function, 
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and the information it does have—such as conviction rates and crime 
rates—provides a poor basis for assessing prosecutors’ performance.  So 
scholars, along with some reformers, have suggested that “transparency is 
the key mechanism” for reining in prosecutors.256 With better information, 
it is hoped, voters will pressure prosecutors’ offices to adopt guidelines and 
procedures to ensure the principled and responsible exercise of 
discretion.257 
This idea has not gone anywhere, either.  “Prosecutors on the whole 
earn low grades for any kind of transparency,”258 and that appears to be 
changing slowly if at all.  Part of the reason may be the glaring difficulty 
that scholars have had deciding what kind of information voters need about 
prosecutors.  The suggestions have ranged from crime and recidivism 
rates,259 to the percentage of defendants who are convicted as charged,260 to 
“regular performance evaluations of head prosecutors” by “[f]ellow 
prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, defendants, victims, and jurors,”261 to 
“the percent of defendants sentenced to incarceration, compared to last 
year” (the lower, the better),262 to the “percent of violent (and serious) crime 
cases on docket, compared to last year” (the higher, the better),263 to the 
“costs the public bears for each case that was or could have been 
prosecuted,” including “expenditures on prosecution, public defense, and 
incarceration,”264 to measures of transparency itself, such as whether the 
office publishes statistics on the cases it declines to prosecute.265 Unless 
they are co-authors, no two scholars ever propose the same metric for 
prosecutorial effectiveness.  There is nothing remotely approaching a 
consensus.  And even if scholars could agree about what information 
prosecutors’ offices should be disclosing, it is not clear the public would 
care about it.  The one statistic about prosecutors’ offices that generally is 
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available to the public, conviction rates, is rarely emphasized in campaign 
rhetoric266 and does not appear to influence a prosecutor’s chance of being 
reelected.267  (Not that we should want it to.)  Democratic oversight of 
prosecutors has been stymied not just by a lack of transparency but, more 
importantly, by uncertainty regarding what we should want prosecutors to 
be transparent about. 
One sign of how little has been accomplished through greater 
transparency of prosecutorial decision-making is the difficulty that scholars 
have had identifying success stories.  The two scholars who have given the 
most thought to transparency as a tool for reforming prosecutors’ offices, 
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright, point to the models provided by Harry 
Connick, the New Orleans District Attorney for the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, and Russell Hauge, until recently the Prosecuting 
Attorney for Kitsap County, Washington.  Miller and Wright praise 
Connick for his use of case processing data to manage the attorneys in his 
office, and they praise Hauge’s office for publishing its policies and a range 
of annual performance statistics, including the number of cases referred to 
the office, the number of cases in which charges were reduced after the 
initial filing, the number of diversions allowed, and the number of positions 
eliminated for budgetary reasons.268 Miller and Wright wrote shortly before 
a series of scandals, culminating in two decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court, turned Connick’s office into “a national whipping boy for 
violating defendants’ rights.”269 In Connick v. Thompson,270 the Court 
narrowly overturned a $14 million award against Connick’s office for 
failing to turn over exculpatory evidence271; four dissenters charged that 
“[f]rom the top down . . . members of the District Attorney’s Office, 
including the District Attorney himself . . . inadequately attended to their 
disclosure obligations” and “slighted [their] responsibility to the profession 
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and to the State’s system of justice.”272 The following year a nearly 
unanimous Court took only three pages to find that discovery violations 
required reversal of a murder conviction obtained by Connick’s office273; 
“[d]uring oral argument, several justices verbally slapped” Connick’s 
successor “for even bothering to defend” the verdict.274 Connick has 
become, at best, an awkward model for prosecutorial accountability. 
Hauge, for his part, was narrowly voted out of office in 2014.275 His 
defeat did not reflect any Connick-style scandals, nor did it suggest that 
Hauge’s efforts at transparency had backfired.  His successor has said she 
plans to continue Hague’s practice of publishing reports of the office’s 
“goal, policies, direction and performance.”276 The practice is surely 
laudable.  But there is little indication that it has triggered any significant 
changes in the office’s operations or deepened its engagement with the 
public.  The issues that led to Hague’s defeat appear to have had little or 
nothing to do with the data he disclosed; instead, they seemed to have 
centered on his support for gun control, his disputes with a local gun club, 
his handling of a civil case involving a contract dispute between the county 
and its deputy sheriffs—and the possibility that after twenty years of his 
leadership, it simply was time for a change.277 
Transparency has disappointed so far as a vehicle for reforming 
prosecutors’ offices not just because it is difficult to decide on performance 
metrics for public servants who blur so many boundaries, but also for two 
other reasons, related as well to the intermediating nature of the 
prosecutor’s job. 
First, there is a constituency for keeping prosecutorial decision-making 
in the shadows, and the constituency is not limited to prosecutors.  Part of 
the reason there has not been more pressure on prosecutors to document and 
to disclose their exercises of discretion is that candor might make it harder 
for prosecutors to carry out some of their work as intermediaries.  There has 
long been concern, for example, that if prosecutors made their charging 
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criteria public, they would no longer be able to soften the edges of the law 
without significantly undermining deterrence.278 There has also been 
concern that if prosecutors had to disclose the reasons for decisions, they 
could not be honest without antagonizing the courts,279 and they could not 
be merciful without antagonizing the electorate.280 Similarly, there have 
been persistent worries about publicly-announced charging criteria being 
turned into “litigation weapons” or otherwise being used to force 
prosecutors to defend departures from rigid uniformity;281 at bottom, these 
are worries that prosecutors would be less free to blur the line between law 
and discretion. 
Second, and more fundamentally, much of what we want from 
prosecutors is fairness, and that is a hard issue to debate in a political 
campaign.  This is why judicial elections are such a bad idea: judicial 
virtues do not lend themselves to reinforcement through the ballot box.282  
By the same token, because judicial virtues are some of what we want from 
prosecutors, electoral oversight, even if greatly strengthened by improved 
transparency, is an unpromising strategy for assessing and rewarding one 
important aspect of a prosecutor’s performance. 
Of course, other aspects of the prosecutor’s job do seem amenable to 
electoral review.283 That is why electing prosecutors is easier to defend than 
electing judges, and it is part of the reason judges are so reluctant to review 
discretionary decisions by prosecutors.  We want prosecutors “to strike the 
appropriate balance between independence and accountability . . . to their 
constituents”284; in other words, we want them to mediate between 
democratic responsiveness and detached objectivity.  This particular 
mediating role of prosecutors is related to and helps facilitate some others, 
such as the boundary-blurring function that Nicholas Parrillo describes 
prosecutors performing in the nineteenth century: softening the edges of 
“alien imposition” by mediating between positivist legislation and 
community norms.285  It is partly prosecutors’ ambiguous relationship to 
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local, democratic accountability that allows them to carry out the job that 
Parrillo identifies.  And that may help to explain why, as legal authority in 
Europe gradually becomes more centralized and “alien imposition” from 
Brussels becomes more pronounced,286 there are moves across the continent 
to make prosecutors somewhat more responsive to local, popular 
preferences.287 Increasingly, European prosecutors—like their American 
counterparts—provide “a kind of suspension bridge between politics and 
the judiciary.”288 
CONCLUSION 
It is precisely the bridges that prosecutors supply—between law and 
politics, rules and discretion, courts and police, advocacy and objectivity—
that have made curtailing prosecutorial power and taming prosecutorial 
discretion so much more difficult than reformers have often expected.  The 
intermediation performed by prosecutors makes them difficult to regulate.  
As I have tried to demonstrate, though, the intermediation is not incidental 
or accidental; it is what we have asked prosecutors to do.  Therefore, if we 
are serious about reforming the modern prosecutor’s office, or replacing it 
with a different kind of institution, either we will need to find other ways to 
blur the lines that prosecutors cross, or we will need to rethink our 
commitment to making those boundaries so indistinct.  And if we are 
unconvinced that prosecutors need significant reform, if we are comfortable 
with or even enthusiastic about the various forms of flexibility they provide, 
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